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Abstract 
This paper aims to identify the relationship between the output-oriented technical efficiency of Italian private hospitals 
and their ownership structure. Using the one-step Stochastic Frontier Analysis technique, we explain technical efficiency 
throughout a set of variables capturing the firm’s shareholder activity, ownership concentration, and managerial 
ownership. Results suggest that (1) technical efficiency is positively affected by managerial ownership, and (2) private 
hospitals are more efficient when ownership concentration is low. 
Keywords: Technical Efficiency; Private Health System; Ownership; Stochastic Frontier. 
JEL Classification: D24; L25; I10. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, firms operating in Italy’s health sector have experienced profound 
environmental and institutional change. Both the growth in demand for health care and the reduction 
of resources provided by governments have led to the rise and growth of private hospitals. Like public 
hospitals, these private firms must establish priorities in terms of improving efficiency, i.e., 
containing costs without affecting the quality of care. To address these challenges, a change in the 
organizational paradigm, including the ownership structure, could be appropriate. 
Previous research has widely investigated the efficiency of the health industry (Valdmanis, 1990; 
Cavalieri et al., 2017), mainly dealing with non-economic measures for both inputs (number of beds, 
physicians, nurses, etc.) and outputs (number of discharges, patients, etc.) of the production function. 
It has also exclusively focused on the efficiency of public hospitals, in which corporate governance 
issues take on specific features. However, little is known about the determinants of firm efficiency in 
the private health sector, and in particular about the impact of private hospitals’ ownership structure 
on their technical efficiency. 
Although firms operating in the private health system represent only a small (but growing) 
proportion of the whole supply of health services, we believe that investigating how ownership 
structure affects their relative efficiency is important, especially in Italy where patients usually turn 
to private hospitals to meet their health needs. Accordingly, we fill this gap in the literature by 
analyzing an unbalanced panel of Italian firms over the period 2007-2018. We rely on balance sheet 
data to overcome the problem of selecting reliable measures for inputs and outputs in private health 
services. Then, we exploit the panel structure of our data set and apply a Stochastic Frontier 
Approach, avoiding all the issues related to the implementation of Data Envelopment Analysis.  
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe our methodology and data, 
respectively. In Section 4 we present the main findings, while Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Methodology 
We measure the output-oriented technical efficiency of Italian private hospitals using a Stochastic 
Production Frontier approach for panel data, as proposed by Farrell (1957). We first apply a flexible 
translog production function (see Christensen et al., 1973), in which the output and inputs are 
expressed in natural log values, as follows: 
 
ln(𝑌𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0ln⁡(𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽1 ln(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 0.5[𝛽2ln⁡(𝐾𝑖𝑡)
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) ln(𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
[1] 
 
where 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the error term with zero mean and constant variance, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a non-negative one-
sided inefficiency term which follows a half-normal distribution. All the parameters in Equation (1) 
are estimated by maximum likelihood. In addition, the technical efficiency (TE) scores for the private 
hospital i in year t are predicted as: 
 
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = exp⁡{−𝑢𝑖𝑡}  
[2] 
 
Each TE score lies between zero and one. A value of one means full technical efficiency, whereas 
a score of less than one means that the private hospital is inefficient for the given technology. 
Once TE scores are obtained using a translog production function, we apply a Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (Greene, 2005), specifically a true fixed effect model (TFE) as it has some advantages over 
other SFA models for panel data. First, it considers not only the technical inefficiency component, 
but also the fact that random shocks may affect the production frontier. Second, it allows us to control 
for heterogeneity, avoiding the strong assumption under which inefficiency is constant over time. In 
fact, a time-invariant inefficiency term leads to overestimated inefficiency and hence a downward 
bias of the estimated TE scores (Greene, 2005). Third, it permits the inclusion of the unobserved 
heterogeneity that is assumed to be correlated to the explanatory variables, allowing it to overcome 
the issues characterizing time-invariant efficiency panel data models (see Pit and Lee, 1981). 
Finally, we include the efficiency determinants 𝑍𝑘 (i.e., nature of the ownership and of the board 
of directors, geographical area) as heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function 𝑢𝑖𝑡, directly 
parameterizing the variance of the inefficiency component (𝜎𝑢). This way, we are able to estimate the 
efficiency determinants along with the parameters of the stochastic production frontier by means of 
a one-stage approach. This procedure has an advantage over the alternative two-stage method, as it 
leads to unbiased estimators of the parameters for the deterministic part of the production frontier. 
 
3. Data Description 
The data was collected from the AIDA database provided by the Bureau van Dijk, containing detailed 
information on Italian listed companies in terms of balance sheet items, and ownership of Italian 
firms, divided into economic sector and geographical area. From the 99 sectors present in AIDA we 
chose sector 8610, i.e. health and hospital services.  
We estimate the technical (in)efficiency of private hospitals using an unbalanced panel of Italian 
firms over the period of 2008–2017. We end up with a sample of 3,725 observations (398 private 
hospitals).  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this empirical exercise. The output 
(Y) is measured by total annual revenues, labor input (L) is measured as the total labor cost including 
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wages, salaries, and social security charges paid at the end of the year, while capital stock (K) in a 
given year is proxied by the nominal value of tangible and intangible assets after depreciation. Both 
the output and inputs are expressed in natural log in our empirical analysis. 
 
Table1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Output1 (Y) 21,317 40,041 33 637,066 
Labor1 (L) 6,803 13,406 5 221,755 
Capital1 (K) 31,216 53,941 110 676,866 
Independence 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Manager 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Institutional 0.06 0.24 0 1 
No_Profit 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Private 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Corporation 0.35 0.48 0 1 
South 0.38 0.49 0 1 
N 3,725    
1 in thousands Euros 
 
Furthermore, among the environmental variables affecting the efficiency of Italian private 
hospitals, Independence takes 1 if the shareholders do not have more than 25% direct or total 
ownership, and 0 otherwise, and Manager takes the value of 1 if at least one managing director is 
also a shareholder and 0 otherwise. Roughly 20% of private hospitals have at least 1 manager who 
owns shares of the firm.  
We also exploit information about the “ultimate owner,” i.e. the shareholder with the highest 
percentage of ownership, then use some proxies of shareholders’ activity. In particular, we add the 
dummies Institutional (1 if the ultimate shareholder is a mutual fund, bank, or insurance company), 
No_Profit (1 if the ultimate shareholder is the public authority or a research institute), Private (1 if 
the shareholder with the highest control of the private hospital is a household), and Corporation (1 if 
the ultimate shareholder is a company). Finally, 38% of private hospitals are located in the Center-
South of Italy.2 
 
4. Main Results 
Table 2 reports the main results. The estimated output elasticities with respect to capital are always 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level and are stable across the five specifications. In addition, the 
change in revenues ranges between 0.96 to 1.27 percent given an increase of capital by 1 percent, and 
in each case it is greater than that obtained for the labor. Furthermore, the total elasticity of the scale 
goes from 0.97 to 1.13, suggesting that increasing all inputs by 1 percent would increase output by 
0.97 to 1.13 percent. 
In Column (1) we add among (in)efficiency determinants the variables Independence and South 
respectively. Findings highlight that private hospitals are more efficient if the ownership 
concentration is low (below 25 percent) and if they are located in the Center-South of Italy. This is 
in line with a branch of the finance literature stressing a negative correlation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance (see La Porta et al., 2002), as a higher degree of ownership 
                                                          
2 Regions in the Center-South are Sicily, Sardinia, Calabria, Apulia, Basilicata, Campania, Molise, and Abruzzo. 
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concentration might be due to underdeveloped capital markets, where holding control as a 
disciplinary mechanism may be ineffective.  
In Column (2) we also look at the variation in the technical efficiency of Italian private hospitals 
when owners are also managers, finding again a positive impact on the efficiency of firms under 
scrutiny. In fact, when shareholders operate as managers within private hospitals, both information 
asymmetry and interest misalignment (managerial opportunism, empire building) between the 
principal and the agent are minimized (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
 
Table 2: One-Step Estimates for the Proﬁt Eﬃciency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lnCapital (β0) 1.2591*** (0.086) 1.2696*** (0.088) 0.9626*** (0.085) 0.9731*** (0.083) 
lnLabor(β1) -0.1284* (0.072) -0.1719** (0.071) 0.0081 (0.074) -0.0447 (0.073) 
1/2 lnLabor2 (β2) 0.1368*** (0.007) 0.1342*** (0.007) 0.1406** (0.007) 0.1382*** (0.007) 
1/2 Capital2 (β3) -0.0889*** (0.014) -0.0983*** (0.014) -0.0419*** (0.014) -0.0483*** (0.014) 
lnLabor × 
lnCapital(β4) 
-0.0624*** (0.019) -0.0471** (0.019) -0.0976*** (0.019) -0.0830*** (0.019) 
𝜎𝑢         
Independence -2.0819*** (0.376)     -1.8939*** (0.328) 
South -0.6721*** (0.081) -0.6927*** (0.075) -0.6888*** (0.075) -0.7033*** (0.082) 
Manager     -0.6122*** (0.100)   
Institutional      -0.4760*** (0.178) -0.8875*** (0.200) 
NoProﬁt     -2.2291*** -0.754 -3.2662** (1.589) 
Private     0.7435*** (0.096) 0.4364*** (0.101) 
Corporation     0.7458*** (0.096) 0.5025*** (0.100) 
Constant -2.5896*** (0.069) -2.5962*** (0.073) -3.1277*** (0.113) -2.8621*** (0.107) 
𝜎𝑣         
Constant -5.3139*** (0.194) -5.3690*** (0.207) -5.5427*** (0.215) -5.3588*** (0.175) 
Eﬃciency          
(Mean) 0.8624  0.8588  0.8591  0.8646  
(SD) 0.0993  0.0975  0.1034  0.102  
(Minimun) 0.0707  0.0696  0.0655  0.0667  
(Maximun) 0.9922  0.9924  0.992  0.9913  
Returns to scale 1.1343  1.0977  0.9707  0.928  
N. obs. (groups) 3,725(398)  3,725(398)  3,725(398)  3,725(398)  
Standard errors in parentheses (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01) 
 
Moreover, in Column (3) we investigate whether the nature of the “ultimate shareholder” affects 
the output-oriented TE of private hospitals. We highlight how the nature of the ownership indeed 
matters in explaining the variation in our outcome variable. In particular, if the ultimate shareholder 
is a financial firm, a public authority, or a research institute, the efficiency increases by 0.47 and 2.23 
percent respectively. Conversely, having a private company or a household as the “ultimate 
shareholder” negatively affects the outcome variable. Similar results are found when we add to the 
environmental variables not only the nature of corporate ownership but also the level of dependence 
of firms to shareholders, i.e. Independence (see Column 4). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We assessed the relevance of shareholder activity, ownership concentration, and managerial 
ownership in explaining the (in)efficiency of Italian firms operating in the private health sector. 
Evaluating further features of ownership and board of directors in terms of technical efficiency is an 
excellent opportunity for future research. 
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